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Nominalist Realism*
Nicholas K. Jones
This is a draft of a paper forthcoming inNous
Abstract
This paper explores the impact of quantification into predicate position on themeta-
physics of properties, arguing that two familiar debates about properties are funda-
mentally altered by recasting them in a second-order setting. Two theories of prop-
erties are outlined, differing over whether the existence of properties is expressed us-
ing first-order or second-order quantifiers. It is argued that the second-order theory:
(a) provides good reason to regard debate about the locations of properties as con-
tentless; (b) resolves debate about whether properties are particulars or universals in
favour of universals.
1 Introduction
Much contemporary metaphysics proceeds under the Quinean assumption—sometimes
explicit, sometimes implicit—that non-substitutional quantification is always first-order
quantification: non-substitutional quantifiers only bind variables that occupy singular
term position. Yet many philosophers of logic and language are willing to countenance
non-substitutional quantifiers binding variables in the positions of, e.g., plural terms, pred-
icates, and sentences.1 How, if at all, does thismore liberal outlook affect traditionalmeta-
physical debates? This paper explores the impact of quantification into predicate position
on the metaphysics of properties, arguing that some familiar debates about properties are
fundamentally altered by recasting them in a second-order setting.
Central to the metaphysics of properties is the question: what is it for properties to
exist? I present one answer in §2 and another in §3. These answers differ over whether
first- or second-order quantifiers are used to express the existence of properties. This dif-
ference turns out to be significant: the second-order approach undermines two familiar
*Thanks very much to Ralf Bader, Justin Clarke-Doane, Ben Curtis, Salvatore Florio, Anil Gomes, Bob
Hale, Simon Hewitt, Mark Jago, Eleanor Knox, David Liggins, Guy Longworth, Penelope Mackie, Ofra
Magidor, ElizabethMiller, Harold Noonan, Josh Parsons, Ian Phillips, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Martin
Pickup, Jeff Russell, Scott Sturgeon, Jonathan Tallant, Trevor Teitel, Mark Textor, and LeeWalters. Thanks
also to audiences in Birmingham, London,Manchester, Nottingham, andOxford. I’m especially grateful to
David Liggins and AlWison for extensive comments on, and discussion of, this material.
1Onplurals: (Boolos, 1984), (Oliver and Smiley, 2013). Onpredicate quantification: (Prior, 1971, ch3),
(Boolos, 1985), (Rayo andYablo, 2001), (Williamson, 2003), (Wright, 2007). On sentential quantification:
(Prior, 1971, ch3), (Künne, 2003, ch6.2), (Rumfitt, 2014).
2debates about the nature of properties, though in somewhat different ways. §4 argues that
the second-order conception provides good reason to reject debate about the locations of
properties as contentless. And §5 argues that the second-order conception resolves debate
about tropes and universals in favour of universals. §6 concludes.
Two caveats before I begin.
Firstly, the paper is intended in an exploratory spirit. Responses will be available to
several of my arguments. I’ll try to indicate where these lie and why I find them unattrac-
tive, but won’t pretend that these considerations are utterly decisive. My primary goal is
not so much to settle the issues as to show how a higher-order conception of properties
reshapes the well-trodden landscape of metaphysical debate. Definitive mapping of the
new terrain outstrips a single paper.
Secondly, I will not address every theoretical task to which properties have been put.
Thequestion ofwhetherwe should believe that properties exist is the question ofwhat the-
oretical work they can do, of how else it can be done, and of the relative costs and benefits
of the various options. The higher-order conception of properties outlined belowmay not
be capable of doing everything that has been used to motivate the existence of properties.
The question is: which such motivations can it accommodate, which are worth accom-
modating, and how else can they be accommodated? That must await another occasion
(though §3.2 briefly discusses one such motivation). Even if the higher-order approach
cannot ultimately be sustained, we will have learned something important about those de-
bates it undermines by seeing why that is so: they arise because of such-and-such specific
theoretical demands, rather than being forced upon us at the outset.
2 First-order realism
Realists believe that properties exist, whereas nominalists believe that they don’t. What ex-
actly does the existence of properties amount to? Muchof the literature comprises disputes
between competing views about the nature of properties: are they, e.g., tropes, universals,
extensions, intensions, Fregean concepts, or predicates?2 None of these theories answers
our question; for we want to know what these competing theories are theories of. We
want to abstract away from specific views about the nature of properties to uncover the
core realist commitment, which different realisms embellish in different ways.
As I see it, the central plank of traditional forms of realism is an existentially loaded
conception of (at least some) predication.3 These views take the truth of a predication
‘Fa’ to require the existence of more than just the object denoted by the singular term ‘a’:
constituents of reality corresponding to predicates are also required. This section and the
next present two precisifications of this core realist commitment. They diverge over the
use of first- or second-order quantification to capture the existentially loaded nature of
predicates.
First-order realism is the thesis that, for a certain range of substitutions of predicates
2 (Armstrong, 1989) provides an overview.
3 That’s what’s at issue in, e.g., (Quine, 1948, pp29–38), (Armstrong, 1978), (Devitt, 1980), (Armstrong,
1980a), and (van Cleve, 1994).
3for ‘Φ’, the instances of this schema are true:4
Exist 1: 8x1; : : : ; xn

Φ(x1; : : : ; xn)!
9y I(x1; : : : ; xn; y) ^8z1; : : : ; zn(I(z1; : : : ; zn; y)! Φ(z1; : : : ; zn)).
‘I’ regiments the variably polyadic predicate ‘__instantiate(s)__’, the key expressionof first-
order realist ideology.5 So one instance of the schema (for n = 1) says: necessarily, each
red object instantiates something, and, necessarily, only red objects instantiate that thing.
And another instance (for n = 2) says: necessarily, whenever one object’s above another,
there’s something they instantiate; and, necessarily, a pair of objects instantiate that thing
only if the first is above the second.
First-order realism is one way of precisely articulating the connection between pred-
ication and existence at the heart of all forms of realism. Different forms of realism are
obtained by supplementing first-order realism in different ways. For example, theories of
universals strengthen the second embeddedmaterial conditional ‘!’ in instances of Exist
1 to a biconditional. I’ve formulated Exist 1 with a conditional in order to ensure consis-
tency with trope theory. I discuss tropes and universals further in §5. In the meantime,
three comments on first-order realism follow, by way of elaboration.
First comment. The quantifiers in Exist 1 are first-order: they bind variables that oc-
cupy singular termposition.6 Moreover, these quantifiers are unrestricted: they range over
the entire supply of potential referents for singular terms, and no further. Unrestricted
readings of the quantifiers in all displayed principles are intended throughout. I use ‘ob-
ject’ for anything in the range of unrestricted first-order quantification; that is, for any
potential referent of a singular term. A singular term could denote it iff an unrestricted
first-order quantifier ranges over it iff it’s an object. Note that this is merely a terminolog-
ical stipulation, designed to facilitate discussion and forestall confusion, not a substantive
thesis about the nature of objecthood.7
Second comment. First-order realism’s properties are the witnesses for the existential
quantifiers in instances of Exist 1. For example, a’s property of being F is whatever wit-
nesses the existential quantifier in:


Fa! 9y I(a; y) ^8z(I(z; y)! Fz)
Similarly, a and b’s relation of being R is whatever witnesses the existential quantifier in:


R(a; b)! 9y I(a; b; y) ^8z1; z2(I(z1; z2; y)! R(z1; z2))
4 To aid readability, I omit all but the first of a block of variable-binding operators. The official, unab-
breviated, version of the schema thus begins: ‘8x18x28x3 : : : 8xn’.
5 Different realists pronounce ‘I’ differently, or identify it with different pre-existing ideology, e.g.:
‘__has__’, ‘__exemplifies__’, ‘__possesses__’, ‘__falls under__’, ‘__is a member of__’, ‘__is a member of the
actual extension of__’, ‘__is a way that __ is’.
6 For simplicity, I ignore: (a) quantifiers binding variables in singular term position but which aren’t
definable in first-order logic, e.g., ‘there are exactly @1x such that’ and ‘most x such that…are such that’; (b)
non-singular quantifiers binding variables in term position, e.g., ‘some xs are such that’.
7 SeeHale (2013, ch1) for a similar conception of objecthood, though he takes it as a substantive matter
with non-trivial metaphysical consequences.
4The idea is as follows. We begin with a relatively uncontroversial body of observation and
theory, which nominalists and realists both accept.8 First-order realists supplement this
with Exist 1, thereby generating novel existential commitments. The properties are what-
ever entities to whose existence first-order realists are thereby committed. Nominalists
reject Exist 1, and the existence of properties along with it.
Of course, matters are more complex than this. It may be possible to characterise,
using only materials on which all parties agree, an interpretation for ‘I’ that verifies the
instances of Exist 1. That would yield a reductive analysis of properties, thereby refuting
the letter of nominalism—at least, as I’m using the term—without nominalistically unac-
ceptable existential commitment; that is, without existential commitments beyond those
of the nominalist’s and realist’s shared stock of background beliefs. The lesson is that the
existence of properties should be controversial only relative to (a) a specification of their
theoretical role, which enriches Exist 1 and constrains the interpretation of ‘I’, and (b)
a background view of reality. The more demanding the theoretical role and the less lib-
eral the view of reality, the more controversial first-order realism will be. I’ll assume for
simplicity that no reductive analysis of properties is available.
Third comment. Different versions of first-order realism will countenance different
substitution instances of Exist 1. On abundant views, all or most predicates have corre-
sponding properties. On sparser views, only some predicates have corresponding proper-
ties, typically those that play a privileged role in the natural sciences.9 We needn’t decide
between these views here.
My presentation of first-order realism is now complete. First-order realists use quan-
tification into singular termposition and an instantiation predicate to achieve various the-
oretical goals. As I said in the Introduction, I won’t discuss those goals here. A glance at
the literature suggests that realists are typically (best interpreted as) first-order realists; for
they either explicitly use first-order quantification to formulate their view, or engage in
debates—e.g. about instantiation (§3.1), or about property-location (§4), or about tropes
and universals (§5)—thatmake little sense, or proceed quite differently, under the second-
order view outlined in the next section.
3 Second-order realism
First-order quantifiers bindvariables standing in singular termposition. Second-order quan-
tifiers bind variables standing inpredicate position. This sectionpresents a view that differs
from first-order realism by using second-order quantification to articulate the existentially
loaded nature of predication. §3.1 presents the view. §3.2 outlines the interpretation of
second-order quantification on which it rests. And §3.3 argues that it warrants the label
‘realism’.
8 This is an idealisation. Particular nominalists and realists will often disagree about all sorts of things.
Yet there remains much neutral territory within which their views about properties don’t require disagree-
ment.
9 (Armstrong, 1980b) defends sparsity. (Lewis, 1983) discusses sparsity and abundance.
53.1 Second-order realism introduced
Second-order realism is the thesis that, for a certain range of substitutions of predicates for
‘Φ’, the instances of this schema are true:
Exist 2: 8x1; : : : ; xn

Φ(x1; : : : ; xn)!
9Y Y(x1; : : : ; xn) ^8z1; : : : ; zn(Y(z1; : : : ; zn)! Φ(z1; : : : ; zn).
First- and second-order realism are different ways of precisely articulating an existentially
loaded conception of predication. First-order realism uses first-order existential quantifi-
cation and an instantiation predicate in the instances of Exist 1 to capture the existential
commitments of predicates. Second-order realism uses second-order existential quantifi-
cation in the instances of Exist 2 instead. Because second-order variables occupy predicate
position, second-order realism needs no instantiation predicate to connect objects that
satisfy ‘F’ with that predicate’s (second-order) existential commitments; ordinary predi-
cation, which is required by all forms of realism, will do instead.
As with first-order realism, second-order realism’s core commitment to the instances
of Exist 2might be embellished in various ways. I discuss one in §4 and another in §5. The
rest of this subsection makes an initial case in favour of second-order realism. It’s worth
noting that first- and second-order realism aren’t incompatible, though for simplicity I’ll
write as if second-order realists reject (non-reductive) first-order realism.
Second-order realism should be relatively uncontroversial. To see why, consider the
second-order rule of existential generalisation:
EG2: FromA, one may infer p9XA[X=Φ]q, whereA[X=Φ] results fromA by replacing (zero
or more) occurrences of the predicate Φ with ‘X’ (and (a) Φ is free for ‘X’ inA, and
(b) Φ and ‘X’ are of the same degree).
EG2 is widely accepted amongst advocates of second-order quantification,10 and rightly
so. Second-order existential generalisation must surely satisfy some such principle if it is
to count as a genuine existential quantification. I shall therefore assume that EG2 is valid,
and leave it to those who would reject the below argument for second-order realism to
state their preferred alternative.11
Now, this is uncontroversially true:
8x

Fx!  Fx ^8z(Fz! Fz)
10 Two examples: (Shapiro, 1991, p66) and (Hale, 2013, p180) (though Shapiro employs the equivalent
principle for universal quantification formulated in a non-modal language).
11 One complication is that standard principles for quantification, identity, and modal operators allow
one to prove, as a theorem, that, necessarily, everything necessarily exists. That might be taken to cast doubt
on EG2’s validity in modal contexts. The issues are too complex to examine properly here. I note only
that rejection of EG2 is not the only potential response to this problem, and that even restricted versions
will tend to validate the argument in the text. For if ‘Fx ^ 8z(Fz ! Fz)’ is true at a world w (relative
to some assignment α), it’s true at w (relative to α) under the intended interpretation assigning the correct
interpretation to ‘F’. That interpretation of ‘F’ then witnesses ‘9Y(Yx^8z(Yz! Fz)’ atw (relative to α);
for if the correct interpretation of ‘F’ didn’t exist at w, ‘F(x)’ wouldn’t be true at w (relative to α).(Wiggins,
2003) and (Williamson, 2013)discuss the interactionbetween classical quantification theory and contingent
existence in more detail.
6Orthodox reasoningwith quantifiers, modal vocabulary, andEG2, licenses inference from
that to:
8x

Fx! 9Y Yx ^8z(Yz! Fz)
That follows straightforwardly from an uncontroversial truth, given the validity of EG2.
Since F was arbitrary, each monadic instance of Exist 2 should be uncontroversial too,
given EG2. Likewise for the polyadic case. Whereas first-order realists use the existen-
tial commitments of controversial metaphysical theses—i.e. the instances of Exist 1—to
achieve various theoretical goals, second-order realists employ only principles that should
be relatively uncontroversial. The only controversies should concern the intelligibility of
second-order quantification and the principles governing it, not the existential commit-
ments of second-order realism; for once the intelligibility of second-order quantification
and validity of EG2 are admitted, the characteristic existential claims of second-order re-
alism follow from uncontroversial truths.
First-order realists shouldn’t respond to this argument by rejecting second-order quan-
tification as unintelligible; for first-order realists need second-order quantification to cap-
ture their view’s intended content. As stated, Exist 1 is schematic; its instances entail the
existence only of properties corresponding topredicates of someparticular language. First-
order realists typically don’t regard properties as restricted by expressibility in the language
we presently speak, or even in any language that beings broadly like ourselves could pos-
sibly speak. The existence of properties is supposed to be an objective matter that may
outrun our linguistic and epistemic capacities. Undiscoverable properties may thus cor-
respond to predicational truths that beings like ourselves cannot possibly express. It is
therefore not guaranteed that any possible collection of instances of Exist 1 will capture
first-order realism’s intended content. The natural solution is to generalise over all predi-
cational aspects of reality, as in this modification of (the monadic form of ) Exist 1:12
8X; x

Xx! 9y I(x; y) ^8z(I(z; y)! Xz)
This, rather than any possible collection of instances of a schema such as Exist 1, is what
thefirst-order realist intends, or at least should intend. First-order realists therefore cannot
consistently deny the intelligibility of the alternative second-order position.
Because each instance of Exist 2 should be uncontroversial, second-order realismmost
naturally delivers an abundant view onwhich each predicate determines a property.13 This
contrasts with first-order realism. Each instance of Exist 1 is independent of standard
principles of first-order (and second-order) logic. So there is no parallel broadly logi-
cal motivation for abundant first-order realism, or even for first-order realism at all. A
12 Sparse first-order realists will want: 8X natural(X) ! 8x Xx ! 9y I(x; y) ^ 8z(I(z; y) !
Xz)

.
13 Note, however, that second-order realism alone cannot force a conception of properties so abundant
that there’s one for each set of objects. The reason is that each theory satisfiable when the second-order
quantifiers have an infinite domain is satisfiable when they have a denumberably infinite domain; yet there
are non-denumerably many sets. Nothing expressible in the language of second-order logic can rule out the
Henkin semantics behind this result in favour of an alternative semantics that blocks it, e.g., the standard
semantics on which second-order quantifiers always range over the full powerset of the first-order domain.
See (Shapiro, 1991, chs3–4, esp.Theorem 4.18). Thanks to Salvatore Florio for assistance here.
7sparse approach can, however, be simulated within second-order realism by adapting a
technique from David Lewis.14 On Lewis’s abundant view, every set is a property. He in-
vokes a primitive predicate of sets to simulate a sparser theory: not all sets/properties are
perfectly natural. The second-order realist can adopt a similar restriction, expressed by a
second-level predicate ‘N’ that combines with first-level predicates of arbitrary degree to
form sentences. Sparse second-order realism is the thesis that, for a certain range of sub-
stitutions of privileged predicates for ‘Φ’—presumably the primitive predicates of some
natural science—the instances of this schema are true:
Sparse Exist 2: 8x1; : : : ; xn

Φ(x1; : : : ; xn)!
9Y N(Y) ^ Y(x1; : : : ; xn) ^8z1; : : : ; zn(Y(z1; : : : ; zn)! Φ(z1; : : : ; zn).
Note that, absent independent account of ‘N’—independent of the proposed instances
of Sparse Exist 2—the instances of Sparse Exist 2 should be no more controversial than
those of Exist 2.
3.2 Amerely notational distinction?
Is the distinction between first- and second-order realism a substantive distinction? Or are
these merely syntactically different ways of saying the same thing? Well, it depends what
second-order quantifiers mean. There isn’t space to investigate that properly here. Instead,
I assume without argument a popular and attractive conception of second-order quan-
tification. Central to this view is a fundamental semantic distinction between first- and
second-order quantification. The best arguments for this distinction use variants of Rus-
sell’s Paradox andCantor’s PowerclassTheoremtoundermine the idea that the range of un-
restricted first-order quantification includes that of second-order quantification. Rather
than rehearse those arguments here, however, I simply take the view for granted.15 My
primary concern is with second-order realism’s impact on the metaphysics of properties,
given this conception of second-order quantification. The view is as follows.
Second-order quantification is a perfectly legitimate and intelligible form of genuine
(non-substitutional) quantification that cannot be understood or explicated in first-order
terms. It is neither a disguised form of first-order quantification, nor quantification over
a special kind of object in the range of unrestricted first-order quantification or to which
singular termsmay refer. Instead, second-order quantification is a sui generis formof quan-
tification thatmust beunderstood in its own termsornot at all. Adequate accounts ofwhat
second-order quantifiers rangeovermust be givendirectly in second-order terms, just as ac-
counts ofwhat first-order quantifiers range over are given in first-order terms. There is thus
a fundamental semantical distinction between these two orders of quantification: first-
and second-order quantified sentences express fundamentally different kinds of quantifi-
cational truth-conditions. The familiar classification of quantifiers into the substitutional
14 (Lewis, 1983)
15OntheRussellian andCantorian arguments, see (Williamson, 2003, §9), (Rayo andWilliamson, 2003,
§1), (Linnebo, 2006), and (Linnebo and Rayo, 2012). For more general discussion of the view’s philosophi-
cal underpinnings, see Prior (1971, ch3), Rayo and Yablo (2001),Wright (2007),MacBride (2008, §19.2.2),
andWilliamson (2013, pp254–261).
8and the objectual is therefore not exhaustive; for second-order quantification is neither
substitutional nor objectual (since the objects constitute the range of unrestricted first-
order quantification). Second-order quantifiers are both genuinely (non-substitutionally)
quantificational and yet irreducibly second-order.
This semantic distinction is essential to second-order realism’s import. Suppose second-
order quantifiers range over objects that first-order quantifiers can range over. Then the
truth-conditions of second-order quantified sentences are expressible in first-order terms.
This renders Exist 2’s instances semantically equivalent to instances of Exist 1, differing
only over whether the instantiation predicate is made explicit.16 The distinction between
these forms of realism becomes merely notational, undermining my arguments in §§4–
5. For example, §4’s argument requires that certain expressions have argument positions
that meaningfully accept first- but not second-order variables. That restriction could be
circumvented by replacing second-order quantifiers with first-order quantifiers with the
same domain. Only the present semantic distinction can prevent that.
On this interpretation of second-order quantification, second-order realism cannot
accommodate a prominent motivation for realism. Since first-order quantifiers can range
over any potential referent of a singular term, second-order realism cannot supply referents
for apparent natural language singular terms for properties like ‘justice’. How problematic
is that? As I said in the Introduction, I want to bracket such questions about what theoret-
ical work a given conception of properties can do. I want to focus instead on exploring a
novel and potentially fruitful view. I therefore leave it to the reader to decide how serious
a cost this is. Personally, however, I am yet to be convinced either that (i) such expressions
are really singular terms,17 or (ii) even if they are singular terms, they really do refer.
Relatedly, one might be concerned that second-order realism suffers from a version
of Frege’s notorious concept horse problem, on this interpretation of second-order quan-
tification.18 How are we to specify the referents of predicates, if second-order quantifiers
don’t range over objects to which singular terms may in principle refer?
I cannot address this deep and difficult problem properly here.19 Note, however, that
second-order realism alone does not generate the problem. The problem is about spec-
ifying the referents of predicates. But second-order realism does not say that predicates
refer. Second-order realism is a thesis about the relationship between predication and ex-
istential generalisation, which uses second-order quantification to capture the existential
import of predicates. A given predicate’s existential import is expressed by an instantia-
tion of the second-order existential quantifier in the appropriate instance of Exist 2. That
instantiation replaces the bound second-order variable with a predicate. So the existen-
tial import of predicates can be expressed without using singular terms for properties or
predicate referents. The concept horse problem therefore does not arise.
16 For example, the following instance (i) of Exist 1 expresses the truth-condition of the correspond-
ing instance (ii) of Exist 2: (i) 8x F(x) ! 9y I(x; y) ^ 8z(I(z; y) ! F(z); (ii) 8x F(x) !
9Y Y(x) ^8z(Y(z)! F(z).
17 A helpful discussion of the relevant issues here is (Button, 201X, §§2.3–2.4).
18 Frege (1892). For discussion, see Dummett (1973, ch7)Wright (1998), MacBride (2008, §19.2), Hale
andWright (2012), and Hale (2013, ch1).
19 Dummett (1973, pp211–218), Jones (2016), and Trueman (2016) discuss the problem in the present
kind of setting.
93.3 A form of realism?
With second-order realism and my preferred interpretation of second-order quantifica-
tion now in place, two related doubts might arise. Is second-order realism really a form
of realism? Does it really entail the existence of properties? This subsection argues for
positive answers to both questions.
As I said in §2, the core of traditional forms of realism is an existentially loaded con-
ception of predication, on which the truth of ‘Fa’ requires the existence of more than just
the object denoted by ‘a’: predicates bring their own distinctive existential commitments.
First- and second-order realism share this conception of predication. Under first-order
realism, this instance of Exist 1 captures ‘F’ ’s existentially loaded nature:
8x

Fx! 9y I(x; y) ^8z(I(y; z)! Fz)
Under second-order realism, this parallel instance of Exist 2 captures ‘F’ ’s existentially
loaded nature:
8x

Fx! 9Y Yx ^8z(Yz! Fz)
Both forms of realism thus see true predications as requiring the existence of more than
just the objects denoted by their constituent singular terms. They differ only over the use
of first- or second-order quantifiers to express these existential commitments of predicates
(and the need for an instantiation predicate). So second-order realism is indeed a form of
realism. Exist 1 and Exist 2 provide different ways of precisely articulating exactly what
the existentially loaded nature of predication amounts to.
This argument presupposes that second-order formulae like
9Y Ya ^8z(Yz! Fz)
express existence claims. One might respond by denying that they do. Perhaps only first-
order quantification expresses existence,20 and so second-order quantification doesn’t re-
ally bring “ontological commitment”, in Quine’s (in)famous phrase. This view severs the
connection between second-order existential quantification and existence, and with it
the route from second-order realism to an existentially loaded conception of predication.
Second-order realism then becomes a misnamed form of nominalism. Hence this paper’s
title.
Should we regard only first-order quantification as expressing existence? I know of no
compelling reason to do so.21
Thebest reason I canfind is that theEnglishword ‘exists’ does not permit second-order
usage. We can say that particular objects exist, e.g.: ‘Al exists’. We can also say that objects
20 More carefully: perhaps non-first-order quantification expresses existence only if interpreted as first-
order quantification over a special range of objects. So second-order quantifiers express existence only if
second-order realism reduces to first-order realism because instances of Exist 2 are notational variants on in-
stances of Exist 1. Following §3.2, however, first- and second-order quantified sentences express irreducibly
different quantificational truth-conditions.
21 For related discussion and defence of a similar view about higher-order ontological commitment, fo-
cussing on the plural rather than second-order case, see (Florio and Linnebo, 2015).
10
of particular kinds exist, e.g.: ‘cookies exist’. Both uses can be captured with first-order
quantification, e.g: ‘9x(x = Al)’, ‘9x(x is a cookie)’. But we cannot, in English, attribute
existence to the predicational aspects of reality generalised by second-order sentences like
‘9X(X(Al))’. Strings like ‘is a cookie exists’ are not grammatical English. The point is
not that second-order quantification isn’t expressible in English. The point is that even if
second-order quantification is expressible in English, it doesn’t use the word ‘exists’. So we
speakers of English should not regard the contents of second-order quantified sentences
as concerning existence.
The problem with this argument is its linguistic focus. It shows, at most, that the En-
glish word ‘exists’ can’t be used to express second-order existential generalisation. It re-
mains open that ‘exists’ expresses only the first-order restriction of the background funda-
mental notion: existential generalisation.22 If so, it would be more perspicuous to iden-
tify existence with the more general and fundamental notion of which ‘exists’ expresses a
restriction. On this view, the fully general notion of existence goes with existential quan-
tification regardless of order, and regardless of expressibility with the English ‘exists’.
This issue appearsmerely verbal. First- and second-order quantifiers both express kinds
of generalisation. The question is whether they both express existence too. What turns on
this issue? Why not regard both views as equally acceptable precisifications of our ordi-
nary notion of existence? I see no reason not to do so. One precisification stays closer to
ordinary usage, restricting ‘existence’ to the first-order. The other precisification expands
ordinary usage to track themore general and fundamental underlying notion.23 Both pre-
cisifications are equally legitimate. Dispute about which is correct is no more substantive
than dispute about whether uses of ‘mass’ prior to the discovery of special relativity express
relativistic mass or proper mass.24 Prior usage didn’t distinguish between two interpreta-
tions which we now see come apart. As a result, a semantic decision must now be made,
with neither choice ruled out by earlier usage as incorrect. There is thus a perfectly legit-
imate sense in which all orders of existential quantification express existence.25 On this
precisification of our ordinary notion of existence, second-order realism is indeed a form
of realism because the second-order quantifiers in Exist 2’s instances enforce an existen-
tially loaded conception of predication.
So, second-order realism does indeed involve distinctive commitment about the rela-
tionship between predication and existence. But is that commitment really to properties?
It might appear not. Like ‘object’, ‘thing’, ‘entity’, and ‘individual’, the English word ‘prop-
erty’ is a nominal expression. It’smost naturally regimented as a predicatewhose argument
22 Although convenient, this probably isn’t quite the right way to put it. One can analyse English ‘exists’-
sentences using first-order existential quantification without being committed to ‘exists’ expressing such
quantification. It follows only that certain first-order quantified sentences express what English ‘exists’-
sentences express. The point in the text is then that even if no second-order quantified sentence expresses
what any English ‘exists’-sentence expresses, it remains open that English ‘exists’-sentences express only the
first-order restriction of the fundamental background notion of what’s expressed by existentially generalised
sentences regardless of order.
23 Jones (2016, §5.3) discusses a problem with this notion, and some potential solutions.
24 See Field (1973) for discussion.
25 More strongly: we should reject the ordinary notion of existence as lacking distinctive theoretical im-
port because: (i) our ordinary word ‘exists’ can be precisified in two equally good ways; and (ii) both pre-
cisifications mark distinctions already marked in other, less emotive and loaded, ways.
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position is reserved for singular terms and first-order variables. So ‘9X(X is a property)’
isn’t a well-formed bearer of truth-conditions. Since the second-order realist’s character-
istic existential claims involve second-order quantifiers, she therefore cannot even say that
there are properties. Two complementary responses are available.
First response: the nominal character of ‘property’ is a defect of (philosophical) En-
glish, which makes ‘property’ unsuited to express what it’s intended to express.26 What’s
needed is a higher-order analogue ‘property2(__)’ of ‘property’ whose argument po-
sition accepts predicates and second-order variables. Second-order realists can use this
expression to truthfully say that properties exist: 9X(property2(X)).
Second response: similarities between first- and second-order realism’s characteristic
existential claims warrant thinking of both as involving the existence of properties. Those
characteristic claims are the instances of Exist 1 and Exist 2. The only differences are: (a)
Exist 2 has a second-order quantifier where Exist 1 has a first-order quantifier; (b) Exist
1 but not Exist 2 contains an instantiation predicate. Both views thus impose structurally
similar constraints on the relationship between predication and existence. In light of these
similarities, and absent an alternative account of what the existence of properties involves,
first- and second-order realism should be seen as different precise articulations of the same
informal idea at the heart of traditional realism, namely that predicates are a source of
existential commitment. The existential consequences of second-order realism are rightly
seen as involving the existence of properties.
4 Immanence and transcendence
Two versions of realism are now in place, differing over whether the existence of properties
is expressed in first- or second-order terms. This section and the next examine two debates
about properties from a second-order realist perspective. In the context of first-order re-
alism, the prospects for resolution are dim. We’ll see, however, that second-order realism
dissolves one and resolves the other.
Our first debate is between immanent and transcendent conceptions of properties:
Immanence: All properties are spatially located.
Transcendence: Noproperties are spatially located; despite being instantiated by located
things, properties aren’t themselves located.
This section argues that second-order realism allows us to dissolve this debate.
4.1 Problems for Immanence and Transcendence
Immanence and Transcendence present realists with a dilemma. Neither thesis is attrac-
tive. Yet the only apparent alternative—some but not all properties are located—inherits
the problems of each.27 This section introduces these problems. I don’t claim that they’re
26Thiswas Frege’s (1892, pp185, 192) view of his word ‘concept’ for the referents of predicates. Dummett
(1973, pp211-218), Jones (2016), and Trueman (2016) develop this idea.
27 Exception: the second problem for Immanence below.
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irresolvable. I claim only that they render both Immanence and Transcendence prima
facie unattractive. Sensible realists should try to avoid having to address them. The next
subsection argues that second-order realism provides a well motivated way of doing so.
Defenders of Immanencemust say where properties are located. The most plausible
answer is: a property is exactly located—i.e. it fills and fits within—wherever its bearers
are exactly located. Three problems now arise:
• According to theories of universals, the property of being F is instantiated by exactly
theFs. Whenmany spatially separated things can simultaneously beF, as is typically
the case, being F is multiply exactly located. Surely that’s impossible. Surely nothing
can fill and fit within many disjoint regions at a time.
• Granted that properties are located only where their bearers are located, Imma-
nence implies: there are no uninstantiated properties. But such properties are ar-
guably needed by the truth of statements of natural law. The existence of being 10kg
in massmay be required by the truth of statements of the laws governing mass, and
its relationship to other physical quantities, regardless of whether it’s ever instanti-
ated. Relatedly, the representation theorems that underwrite numerical measure-
ment of a physical quantity impose structural constraints on the quantity’s deter-
minates.28 Those constraints may fail if the instantiated determinates exhibit insuf-
ficient variety, and instantiation is necessary for existence, as Immanence implies.
• Where are relations located? Maybe they’re co-locatedwith each of their relata, and
hence typically bi-located. Or with the fusion of their relata, and hence typically
scattered. Or somewhere between their relata. Although none of these answers
looks attractive, no more attractive alternative is forthcoming.29
Maybe solutions to these problems are available. Yet they do provide prima facie powerful
reasons to find Immanence unattractive.
Unfortunately for realists,Transcendence is also problematic:
• It ismysterioushowthenon-spatial could constrain, governor explain thebehaviour
of the spatial, as transcendent realists often claim.
• Many regard the non-spatial as intrinsically objectionable ormysterious. Many oth-
ers regard it as incompatible with a broadly naturalistic world-view.
28 (Krantz et al., 1971) and (Suppes, 2002, ch3) discuss representation theorems and measurement.
29 A referee offers this interesting suggestion: dyadic relations are located at the ordered pairs of their
relata’s locations. Using ‘L’ to regiment the dyadic location predicate: if relation r holds from a to b, then
L(r; hla; lbi) (where lx is the location of x). As standardly construed, however, ordered pairs and othermath-
ematical objects lack location. So this suggestion appears to entail that relation-locations aren’t in space or
time. A related proposal modifies the logical form of attributions of location to relations by increasing the
location predicate’s argument positions. Just as the instantiation predicate’s degree varies as the relation’s
degree varies, so does the location predicate’s on this view. More precisely: if n-adic relation r holds amongst
a1; : : : ; an (in that order), thenL(r; la1 ; : : : ; lan) (where ‘L’ is n+ 1-adic rather than dyadic as on the previ-
ous proposal). Twoproblems arise. (i)The resulting panoply ofmultigrade relation predicates is a significant
ideological cost. (ii) It is unclear what it means to be located at, e.g., Oxford, London, and how that differs
from simply being multi-located. Perhaps these problems can be overcome. But they are prima facie reasons
to look elsewhere.
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Again, solutions may be available. Yet these problems are prima facie powerful reasons to
findTranscendence unattractive.
Debate about Immanence andTranscendence shows no sign of admitting stable reso-
lution. The difficulties facing both theses combine into a powerful argument for nominal-
ism. Yet it’s hard to escape the feeling that realists needn’t have been forced down this path.
However strong arguments for the existence of propertiesmay be, they surely shouldn’t re-
quire realists to take a stand on Immanence andTranscendence. But it is not clear how to
avoid them; for given that properties exist, each property is surely either located or not. Or
are they? The next subsection argues that second-order realists can bypass this problem.
4.2 A second-order (dis)solution
In order to have a debate about Immanence and Transcendence, we need locative vo-
cabulary with which to conduct it. In particular, we need locative vocabulary applicable
to properties. Although first-order realism guarantees the availability of such vocabulary,
second-order realism doesn’t. Unlike first-order realism, second-order realism therefore
does not guarantee that a debate over Immanence andTranscendencemay be had. Or so
I now argue.30
I focus on ‘is exactly located at’ as a paradigm of locative vocabulary. My discussion
carries over to other locative vocabularymutatismutandis. I regiment ‘is exactly located at’
with the binary predicate ‘L’. The question before us is: what is the logico-semantic form
of ‘L’, and does it permit formulation of Immanence and Transcendence? ‘L’ ’s second
argument-position takes singular terms, typically for regions and places. Our concern is
with its first argument-position.
Let the minimal core be the relatively uncontroversial body of observation, doctrine,
and theory on which realists and nominalists agree.31 The minimal core includes, inter
alia, the apparent truths of ordinary discourse about location, as modified by our best
empirical theory. It doesn’t include attributions of location toproperties; for properties are
a controversial theoretical posit whose interactionwith the rest of our world-view is what’s
under investigation. Insofar as concerns realists and nominalists, whatever constraints the
minimal core places on ‘L’ are uncontroversial. The issue is how those constraints interact
withfirst- and second-order realism’s extensions of theminimal corewithExist 1 andExist
2 respectively.
The minimal core includes attributions of location to cats, dogs, humans, planets,
galaxies, and electrons. They are all denotable by singular terms and first-order quantifiers
range over them. Theminimal core thus requires that ‘L’ ’s first argument-position be open
to singular terms and first-order variables. Filling ‘L’ ’s first argument-position with such
expressions is no obstacle to well-formedness. When doing so results in a sentence, the
compositional semantic interaction between ‘L’ and its other vocabulary delivers a truth-
condition. In short, the minimal core requires that ‘L’ be applicable to objects. Because
first-order realism uses first-order quantification to express the existence of properties, its
properties are a subclass of the objects. First-order realism thereby ensures that these are
30 Thanks to Scott Sturgeon for a helpful discussion of the issues in this subsection.
31 See note 8 for a qualification.
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well-formed:
8x(x is a property ! 9yL(x; y))(1)
8x(x is a property ! :9yL(x; y))(2)
(1) expresses first-order Immanence. (2) expresses first-order Transcendence. The use
of first-order quantification over properties in Exist 1 suffices for these regimentations of
Immanence and Transcendence to be well-formed. So standard compositional princi-
ples supply (1) and (2) with truth-conditions. Under first-order realism, the debate about
Immanence andTranscendence is a debate about which of these truth-conditions is satis-
fied. First-order realism thus guarantees that debate’s coherence. Not so for second-order
realism.
The minimal core includes attributions of location to objects. It doesn’t also include
attributions of location to predicational phenomena. Although our ordinary world-view
includes attributions of location to individual cookies, it doesn’t include attributions of
location to what’s expressed by ‘is a cookie’: ‘is a cookie is in the jar’ isn’t a grammatical
or truth-evaluable string. Regimentation of our best empirical theories does not, as far
as I know, require that ‘L’ ’s first argument-position be open to predicates and second-
order variables. Theminimal core therefore doesn’t require that filling ‘L’ ’s first argument-
position with a second-order variable be no obstacle to well-formedness. And even if such
strings are counted well-formed, the minimal core doesn’t require that ‘L’ be capable of
semantically interacting with predicates and second-order variables, via the compositional
rules, to yield truth-conditions for them. In short, second-order realism and the minimal
core do not ensure that these are well-formed, or that they possess truth-conditions:
8X9yL(X; y)32(3)
8X:9yL(X; y)(4)
(3) is what’s needed to express second-order Immanence. (4) is what’s needed to express
second-order Transcendence. Second-order realists are under no obligation to regard ei-
ther string as a well-formed bearer of truth-conditions. They therefore needn’t accept that
a contentful debate about higher-order Immanence andTranscendencemay be had.
Second-order realists face a choice. Second-order realism and the minimal core do
not together ensure that (3) and (4) possess truth-conditions; so they do not guarantee
that a contentful debate about higher-order Immanence andTranscendencemay be had.
But second-order realism and the minimal core do not together ensure that (3) and (4)
don’t possess truth-conditions; so they do not guarantee that a contentful debate about
higher-order Immanence and Transcendence cannot be had. The minimal core may be
extended in eitherway, to yield truth-evaluable (3) and (4) or not. One extensionpermits a
contentful debate about higher-order Immanence andTranscendence, whereas the other
doesn’t. Second-order realists are free to choose which extension of the minimal core to
endorse.33
32 More cautiously: 8X(9y; z(L(y; z) ^ Xy)! 9yL(X; y)).
33 This may be an exaggeration. In standard formulations of higher-order logic and type theory, no ar-
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To be clear, second-order realists aren’t free to choose whether higher-order Imma-
nence and Transcendence exist to be expressed or not. That objective fact lies beyond
their control. The point is that they are not rationally compelled to take either view,
simply by the logico-semantical form of their theory of properties (i.e. the instances of
Exist 2). Second-order realism and the minimal core are neutral about whether loca-
tive vocabulary can bemeaningfully combinedwith predicates and second-order variables
to express higher-order versions of Immanence and Transcendence. First-order realism
and the minimal core are not. First-order quantification over properties in Exist 1’s in-
stances combineswith attributions of location to objects in theminimal core, to guarantee
the coherence of first-order Immanence andTranscendence. First-order realism’s logico-
semantical form thus combines with the minimal core to settle a theoretical question that
second-order realism leaves open: do higher-order theses of Immanence and Transcen-
dence exist to be expressed or not?
Second-order realists are free to believe that higher-order Immanence andTranscen-
dence cannot be formulated, and that there are no such truth-conditions available to ex-
press. From that perspective, the debate about Immanence andTranscendence collapses:
there is no such debate to be had. Second-order realists may thereby dissolve the debate.
One might be suspicious of this dissolution: surely questions about reality’s structure
cannot be so easily undermined, and especially not by linguistic considerations. To alle-
viate the suspicion, consider a parallel case. Even those working on the locations of prop-
erties aren’t usually concerned about the locations of negation, disjunction or possibility.
That is entirely natural; for it is hard to see debate about disjunction’s location as address-
ing a genuine question. Why?
One attractive answer begins with the observation that disjunction is expressed by a
sentence operator. Discourse about disjunction is discourse about ‘_’ ’s contribution to-
wards truth-conditions. Theses about that contribution’s location are formulable only if
‘L’ ’s first argument position is open to sentence connectives. It isn’t, and so they aren’t.
Sentences like ‘L(_; r)’ are not well-formed. The semantic clauses for ‘L’ and ‘_’ do not
interact with the compositional rules to deliver a truth-condition for ‘L(_; r)’. The logico-
semantical forms of locative anddisjunctive discourse thus explainwhy a contentful debate
about disjunction’s location cannot be had.34
Thesecond-order dissolution of Immanence andTranscendence exactly parallels this
strategy for eliminating questions about disjunction’s location. The only relevant differ-
ence is that debate about the locations of properties is more historically entrenched than
debate about disjunction’s location. The attractiveness of this approach to disjunction
should alleviate suspicion in the second-order case. What the initial suspicion failed to
gument position accepts expressions of multiple type. This isn’t supposed to be a merely grammatical phe-
nomenon, but a syntacticmanifestation of an underlying semantic limitation: no expression ismeaningfully
attributable to “entities” drawn from (the domain of potential semantic values for expressions of ) different
types. On this view, higher-order Immanence and Transcendence do not exist if location is meaningfully
attributable to objects. The argument in the text aims to bypass this complex issue in the foundations of
semantics. See Magidor (2009) and Linnebo and Rayo (2012) for discussion.
34 Following (Hossack, 2007, pp68–72), we could postulate logical objects corresponding to the connec-
tives, by analogywith first-order realism’s properties. Thepossibility of contentful debate about disjunction’s
location would then follow. That is a powerful reason not to postulate such logical objects.
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recognise is that worthwhile theorising, in metaphysics as elsewhere, must be communi-
cable, hence linguistically expressible. Although linguistic analysis alone cannot reveal
reality’s structure, it can expose constraints on what there is to be said about it.
Second-order realists may regard higher-order Immanence andTranscendence as ei-
ther coherent or not. Which view should they adopt? Should they regard (3) and (4) as
well-formed expressions of truth-evaluable theses? Like any other theoretical questions,
these should be addressed via the relativemerits of eachhypothesis. What theoreticalwork
canhigher-order locationdo? What puzzles can it resolve? What can it be used to explain?
As far as I can see, higher-order location does no work, resolves no puzzles, and explains
nothing. It serves only to generate intractable metaphysical debate. These are powerful
reasons not to accept this extension of location beyond the minimal core’s requirements.
Accepting higher-order location’s coherence also places one in an awkward theoretical po-
sition. One must either: (a) justify extending ‘L’ to accept predicates despite rejecting its
extension to sentence operators; or (b) be prepared to admit a parallel debate about the
locations of disjunction, negation and possibility. Neither option is attractive. We thus
have good reason to reject higher-order Immanence and Transcendence as incoherent:
there are no such contents.
Note that higher-order location and quantification differ in this respect. Higher-order
quantifiers have been used in the semantics of unrestricted generality, the foundations of
mathematics, and the analyses of truth and possibility.35 Higher-order quantification, un-
like higher-order location, thus serves purposes other than the generation of metaphysical
debate. That is a good reason to take its coherence seriously.
One might worry that second-order realism will inherit the problems withTranscen-
dence, given this rejection of attribution of location to properties. Theworry ismisplaced.
The view I’ve been describing isn’t a version of Transcendence; for it rejects as contentless
both attributions of location to properties, and the negations of such attributions. Both
Immanence andTranscendence are rejected as contentless. It is not true, as the problems
withTranscendence presuppose, that properties lack location; for properties lack location
only if they are not located, and the present view rejects as contentless all attempts to say
that properties are not located. There are no such contents attributing or denying locations
to properties out there to express. Since the viewdoesn’t admit non-located properties, the
objections to non-located properties aren’t objections to the view, any more than they’re
objections to, say, conjunction, negation, or necessity.36 The initial problems for Tran-
scendence therefore do not arise.
Relatedly, the view is consistent with the attractive thesis that to be is to be located.
35Onunrestricted generality: (Williamson, 2003). On the foundations ofmathematics: (Shapiro, 1991).
On truth: (Künne, 2003, ch6.2), (Rumfitt, 2014). On possibility: (Dunaway, 2013).
36 Following the preceding discussion, no contents attribute or deny locations to negation, conjunction,
or necessity because they’re all expressed by sentence operators, which play a fundamentally different seman-
tic role from the singular terms that canmeaningfully occupy the argument positions of ‘L’. That’s clearly not
a good reason to regard negation, conjunction, or necessity as naturalistically unacceptable or objectionably
disconnected or separated from concrete reality. The same goes for properties, given second-order realism.
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Using ‘E’ as an (first-order) existence predicate, that thesis amounts to:37
8x E(x)$ 9rL(x; r)
Necessarily, all and only located things exist. Of course, this is a first-order thesis. But if
location cannot be meaningfully ascribed or denied to non-first-order aspects of reality, it
follows that reality is completely devoid of unlocated aspects: whatever can be meaning-
fully said to be located or unlocated is located.
We’ve seen that second-order realists have good reason to reject debate about the loca-
tions of properties as contentless. Of course, this isn’t decisive. Perhaps there is theoretical
work for higher-order location that I haven’t considered. Or perhaps it is required by an
adequate regimentation of some aspect of the minimal core. What should be clear, how-
ever, is how second-order realism transforms this debate. The focus shifts from the relative
merits of various theses about the locations of properties to a conceptually prior question
that first-order realism settles out of hand: should we even accept that a contentful debate
about the locations of properties can be had?
4.3 An objection
This subsection responds to anobjection: first-order realists can alsodeny that a contentful
debate about Immanence andTranscendence can be had; for they may deny that (1) and
(2) posssess truth-conditions, despite being well-formed combinations of non-defective
vocabulary.38 We can see this objection as the conjunction of:
(A) Some grammatical combinations of non-defective singular terms and predicates
into atomic predications lack truth-conditions.
(B) Amongst the atomic predications that lack truth-conditions are all attributions of
location ‘L(a; r)’ where ‘a’ denotes a first-order property.
If (A) is true, then first-order realism alone doesn’t entail the coherence of first-order Im-
manence and Transcendence; it does so only in conjunction with additional semantic
machinery. Unless (B) is also true, however, first-order realists seeking to avoid Imma-
nence andTranscendence should take no succour in that.
Before considering this objection, note that, even if sound, it doesn’t underminemuch
of what I’ve said. Second-order realism continues to provide good reason to deny that Im-
manence and Transcendence exist. Perhaps some first-order realists can consistently do
so too. That doesn’t undermine my claim about second-order realism. Moreover, the-
ses (A) and (B) are optional additions to first-order realism, independent of its central
claims. Conjoining themwith first-order realism thus reduces the unity and systematicity
of the overall theoretical package. By contrast, we’ve seen how second-order realism leads
37 Assumption: ‘to be F is to be G’ means that F is necessarily coextensive with G. If that assumption is
false, the displayed formula should bemodified accordingly. The discussion in the text should be unaffected.
38 Could first-orders realist deny that (1) and (2) are well-formed, perhaps by invoking the many-sorted
languages I’ll discuss shortly? The arguments in (Magidor, 2013, §§4, 5, 7 of ch2) suggest not.
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via a natural and well-motivated argumentative route to rejection as contentless of all at-
tempted attributions of locations to properties. That said, the objection from (A) and (B)
is unsound.
I now explain why (A) is unattractive.
Standard semantic analyses of predication treat all grammatical combinations of non-
defective singular terms andpredicates as truth-evaluable, hence as bearers of truth-conditions.
Those theories do not impose distinctions within the semantic values of singular terms
and predicates that restrict their interaction with the compositional rules to prevent those
rules from supplying a truth-condition in all (well-formed) cases. The resulting truth-
conditions needn’t be satisfiable. But they’re truth-conditions nonetheless. Thesis (A)
thus requires semantic distinctions out of line with mainstream semantics. Moreover,
this complication of semantic theory lacks logical or linguistic motivation: it’s postulated
solely for metaphysical reasons. To the extent that semantic theory should be shaped by
logical and linguistic considerations alone, (A) should be resisted.
One might respond by appeal to many-sorted first-order languages. These languages
associate terms, variables, and argument positions with sorts, which are used to restrict
wellformedness and thereby semantic evaluability.39 Avariant couldbedeveloped inwhich
the sorts were syntactically idle, but restricted the applicability of the compositional rules
so that not all atomic predications were assigned truth-conditions. Such a variant many-
sorted settingmight in principle provide a semantical foundation onwhich to defend (A).
However, two difficulties remain.40 Firstly, the proposal still complicates semantic theory
for metaphysical rather than linguistic reasons. We shouldn’t allow metaphysical consid-
erations to warp, say, mathematics, physics, or biology. The same should go for semantics
and logic. Secondly, the semantic restrictions on standard many-sorted languages look
unattractively ad hoc. There is no principled semantic obstacle to combining the sorts
and eliminating artificial restrictions on the compositional rules. The resulting semantic
frameworkwill be inconsistentwith (A).Many-sorted semantics thus provides an insecure
foundation on which to base defence of (A).
Suppose we accept (A) nonetheless. First-order realists seeking to avoid Immanence
andTranscendencemust still argue for (B).What is it about singular terms for properties
that places them in the special class? Why does ‘L(redness; r)’ lack truth-condition, rather
than simply turn out false? Absent an independentlymotivated answer to these questions,
(B) looks like little more than an ad hoc plea for special treatment; as such, it should be
given no credence. Second-order realists, by contrast, can appeal to the fundamentally dif-
ferent semantic roles of singular terms and predicates to justify their corresponding claim
that ‘L(is red; r)’ lacks truth-condition:41 although ‘L’ ’s first argument position can se-
39 (Turner, 2010, pp11–12) suggests usingmany-sorted languages to articulate the idea that each predicate
is meaningfully applicable only to a given category of object.
40 There is a third problem too. (Magidor, 2013, pp85–91) argues that this kind of view conflicts with
the Tarskian biconditionals for propositional truth.
41 Although I haven’t argued that singular terms and predicates play fundamentally different semantic
roles, that’s part and parcel of §3.2’s conception of second-order quantification. The semantic role of a sin-
gular term is to refer to an object. So if predicates play the same kind of semantic role as singular terms,
they refer to objects too. Those objects would then constitute a domain over which second-order quanti-
fiers range. Second-order quantification would be equivalent to first-order quantification over this domain
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mantically interact with singular terms, that provides no reason to expect that it can also
semantically interact with predicates. I see no independent argument for a parallel seman-
tic distinction between singular terms for properties and the rest.
In sum, this objection unwarrantedly complicates semantics for metaphysical reasons
and rests on anunmotivated claim about the semantics of property-terms. It doesn’t follow
that (A) or (B) is false. Maybe firmer theoretical foundations for them can be supplied.
Until then, however, the objection may justifiedly be set aside.
4.4 Extending the lesson
Immanence and Transcendence present first-order realists with a dilemma: neither op-
tion is attractive, and yet the logical form of their theory of properties ensures that they are
contentful. Second-order realists can avoid the dilemma because the logical form of their
property-theory doesn’t guarantee that Immanence and Transcendence are formulable.
Second-order realism doesn’t entail that they can’t be formulated either. So a theoretical
decision is required. Those who wish to treat higher-order location as coherent should
provide positive motivation for this extension of location beyond the requirements of the
relatively uncontroversial minimal core. I haven’t shown that such motivation cannot be
supplied, though it is not at all clear how to do so. In this sense, second-order realism
undermines debate about Immanence andTranscendence.
The strategy is not peculiar to location. Second-order realism potentially undermines
any debate that turns on applying objectual vocabulary to properties. The dialectical fo-
cus shifts from theses featuring that vocabulary, to the theoretical benefits of allowing it
to take non-objectual arguments. Only when the benefits are significant, need the debate
continue. Otherwise, it may be abandoned as a contentless inquiry into pseudo-questions
arising frommisuse of language. Different debates may go different ways. By way of illus-
tration, I briefly mention two debates that might contrast with location.
Can the causal relationholdbetweenproperties? Froma second-order perspective, the
issue iswhetherwe should admit causal vocabularywith argument positions open topredi-
cates. Without taking a stand on the issue here, the possibility arises of using arguments for
type-level causation to motivate admitting such vocabulary. If that strategy is successful,
it differentiates this question about the relata of causation from the one discussed above
about location: only the former retains coherence under second-order realism.
The second debate concerns the nature of ordinary material objects. Bundle theorists
regard them as derivative entities, composed out of properties. In order to bind disparate
properties into unified objects, they require relations of parthood and composition ca-
pable of holding from (a) properties to properties, and (b) properties to objects. From
a second-order realist perspective, a central question is whether to admit parthood and
composition predicates with argument positions open to both terms and predicates. The
putative theoretical benefits of bundle-theoretic analyses of material objects might per-
haps motivate doing so.
of objects, and its truth-conditions would admit explication in first-order terms. That conflicts with §3.2.
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5 Universals and tropes
One prominent conception of properties takes them to be tropes. Another takes them to
be universals.42 This section argues that second-order realism resolves the issue in favour
of universals.
5.1 First-order tropes and universals
Trope theorists maintain that properties are unrepeatable particulars. Universal theorists
maintain that properties are repeatable universals. It is not always clear exactly what re-
peatability and particularity amount to.43 One natural precisification appeals to instan-
tiation. Tropes are unrepeatable in the sense of not being instantiable by distinct objects.
So one object’s trope of being F is distinct from any other object’s trope of being F. The
universal of being F is repeatable in the sense of being instantiated by every F. We can now
see first-order trope theory and universal theory as embellishments of first-order realism
that supplement the instances of Exist 1 with additional theses. Some notation will help
with stating those principles:
• x1; : : : ; xn 6= z1; : : : ; zn =df: (x1 6= z1^: : :^x1 6= zn)_: : :_(xn 6= z1^: : :^xn 6=
zn) _ (z1 6= x1 ^ : : : ^ z1 6= xn) _ : : : _ (zn 6= x1 ^ : : : ^ zn 6= xn).
(Roughly, in English: some xi is distinct from each zj or some zj is distinct from
each xi. Or: the xs are not coextensive with the zs.)44
First-order trope theory and universal theory are the results of combining first-order real-
ism with:
Trope 1: 8x1; : : : ; xn; y
 
I(x1; : : : ; xn; y)!
8z1; : : : ; zn(x1; : : : ; xn 6= z1; : : : ; zn ! :I(z1; : : : ; zn; y))

.
Universal 1: 9x8y1; : : : ; yn(I(y1; : : : ; yn; x)$ Φ(y1; : : : ; yn))

.
Universal 1 is a schema whose substitution instances are obtained by replacing ‘Φ’ with
a predicate that is also substitutable for ‘Φ’ in Exist 1. Different versions of first-order
universals theory admit different instances. Some instances must be inadmissible, on pain
42 Trope theorists include: (Williams, 1953), (Campbell, 1981). Universal theorists include: (Russell,
1967, chs9–10), (Armstrong, 1978).
43 (MacBride, 2005) criticises the particular/universal distinction.
44 A simpler definition is: x1; : : : ; xn 6= z1; : : : ; zn iff hx1; : : : ; xni 6= hz1; : : : ; zni; i.e., iff x1 6= z1 _
x2 6= z2 _ : : : _ xn 6= zn. Using this definition in Trope 1, R(a; b) and R(b; a) generate distinct R-tropes
whenever a 6= b. Even for symmetric R. Plausibly, however, there should be only one such R-trope when R
is symmetric; for then only one way for things to be can result from combining R, a, and b. See Fine (2000)
andMacBride (2007) for discussion. The more demanding definition of distinctness in the text avoids this
commitment. That definition is strictly stronger than the present suggestion. So the official definition yields
a strictly weaker version of Trope 1. I use that weaker thesis because (a) problems with the weaker thesis
are automatically problems for the stronger thesis that entails it, but not conversely, and (b) some of the
problems for trope theory considered below involve symmetric predicates for which the stronger thesis is
less plausible.
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of Russell’s paradox. A more cautious version of Universal 1 would also be restricted to
satisfied substitutions for ‘Φ’.
Note thatTrope 1 is compatible with some instances of Universal 1. If only one pos-
sible object can be F,Trope 1 is compatible with the corresponding instance of Universal
1. Incompatibility arises when more than one possible object can be F. In typical cases,
manypossible objects canbeF; the universal of beingF encodes this commonality amongst
them. So typical instances of Universal 1 are incompatible with Trope 1. For simplicity,
I proceed as if the first-order theories of tropes and universals cannot both be true.
Unlike Immanence andTranscendence, neitherTrope 1 norUniversal 1 is obviously
problematic. Yet this debate has also stalled. Although each view has its defenders, it’s
unclear how neutral bystanders could rationally decide between them. Maybe we have
to learn to live with this situation. It would be better not to have to. I’ll now argue that
second-order realism resolves the issue in favour of universals.
5.2 Second-order tropes and universals
The second-order analogues of Trope 1 andUniversal 1 are:
Trope 2: 8x1; : : : ; xn;Y
 
Y(x1; : : : ; xn)!
8z1; : : : ; zn(x1; : : : ; xn 6= z1; : : : ; zn ! :Y(z1; : : : ; zn))

.
Universal 2: 9X8y1; : : : ; yn(X(y1; : : : ; yn)$ Φ(y1; : : : ; yn))

.
This issue is readily resolved in favour of second-order universals.
Whereas the admissible substitution instances of Universal 1 must be restricted to
avoid contradiction, every instance whatsoever of Universal 2 should be uncontroversial.
Sentences of this form are uncontroversially true:
8y1; : : : ; yn(R(y1; : : : ; yn)$ R(y1; : : : ; yn))
Each instance of Universal 2 follows from such a sentence by a single application of EG2.
So the second-order theory of universals should be uncontroversial, given the validity of
EG2. As noted in §3.1, acceptance of EG2 is widespread amongst advocates of second-
order logic.
Whereas each instance of Universal 2 is easily seen to be true,Trope 2 is inconsistent
with one of the most basic aspects of our ordinary and scientific world-views: many dis-
tinct objects can be of the same type. For example: you and I are different humans beings;
the universe contains many electrons; there are uncountably many real numbers. Many
sentences of this form are therefore true:
Fa ^ Fb ^ a 6= b
This says that objects a and b are different Fs. Yet Trope 2 implies that distinct objects
aren’t both Fs:45
(Fa ^ a 6= b)! :Fb
45 Assumption: second-order universal generalisations can be instantiated for arbitrary constant predi-
cates.
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These jointly entail a contradiction. Since F was arbitrary, Trope 2 implies that distinct
objects cannot be of the same type: there is at most one human being, or electron, or
real number. Generalising to the relational case: only one pair of objects are of the same
height, or spatially separated, or causally related, or such that one succeeds the other. And
even worse: Trope 2 implies that distinct objects aren’t both self-identical, and hence that
there’s only one object. Such radical departure from our ordinary and scientific world-
views should be rejected, andTrope 2 along with it.
Notice that Trope 1 lacks these consequences. If a and b are different Fs, Trope 1
entails only that they instantiate none of the same first-order objects. Given Exist 1, it
follows that they instantiate distinct first-order F-properties, i.e. objects instantiation of
which strictly suffices for being F. That’s consistent with a and b both being F. First-order
trope theory is thus not so easily refuted.
One might worry that this argument targets a straw man. As far as I’m aware, extant
trope theorists are all best interpreted as first-order trope theorists. So the argument is
powerless against them. However, my goal was not to refute extant trope theorists. My
goal was to show that second-order realism resolves debate about tropes and universals in
favour of second-order universals. Whereas the first-order debate about tropes and uni-
versals is intractable and contentious, the parallel second-order debate is readily resolved
because: (a) the second-order theory of universals follows from uncontroversial truths by
relatively uncontroversial principles of second-order logic; (b) the second-order theory of
tropes is inconsistent with some of the most central components of our world-view.
Given the argument of §4, a stronger conclusion may be available.46 The difficulties
facing first-order Immanence andTranscendence constitute a powerful case against first-
order realism, which second-order realism resolves. That is a good reason for realists to be
second-order realists. This section argued that second-order realists should reject second-
order tropes in favour of second-order universals. So we also have an argument against all
orders of trope theory, including first-order: realists should be second-order realists, hence
not trope theorists.
5.3 A trope-theoretic reply
This section considers three responses on behalf of the trope theorist.47 Although unsuc-
cessful, they cannot be dismissed out of hand.
The problem arose from the apparent truth of sentences like:
(5) Fa ^ Fb ^ a 6= b
This says that distinct objects a and b are of the same specified type, F. Where ‘f’ denotes
the universal of being F, the first-order universals realist can capture this as:
(6) I(a; f) ^ I(b; f) ^ a 6= b
Since first-order trope theorists deny that distinct objects can instantiate the same prop-
erty, they cannot capture sameness of specified type in this way. If their trope theory is to
capture such facts, a different approach is required.
46 Thanks to a referee for pointing this out.
47 Thanks to Ben Curtis for suggesting this kind of response.
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Rather than saying that a and b instantiate identical tropes, aweaker relationship, com-
patible with distinctness, must be used. Since the analysis is supposed to capture sameness
of specified type, different types will require different relationships.48 Regimenting this
with the binary predicate ‘RF’, first-order trope theorists can use this sentence in place of
the universal theorist’s (6):
9x; y I(a; x) ^ I(b; y) ^ a 6= b ^ RF(x; y)
This says that distinct objectsa andb instantiate tropes thatRF one another. Since ‘RF(x; y)’
doesn’t entail ‘x = y’, first-order trope theorists can regard this as true, unlike (6).
I nowconsider threeways inwhich second-order trope theoristsmight try to adapt this
strategy to respond to the previous subsection’s argument. Each strategy re-conceptualises
the phenomenon we would ordinarily use (5) to report, and does so in a way consistent
withTrope 2. As we will see, each only postpones the problem.
First strategy: where we would ordinarily use the same predicate twice to say that a
and b are both Fs, by writing ‘Fa ^ Fb’, use a single new relational predicate ‘a F b’ by
analogy with ‘RF’.49 The phenomenon reported by (5) is then re-described as:
a F b ^ a 6= b
Unlike (5), this is consistent with Trope 2. Under this re-conceptualisation of the phe-
nomenonwe’d ordinarily use (5) to report, it is consistent with second-order trope theory.
The strategy cannot accommodatemore than two Fs. Suppose a; b; c are three distinct
Fs. Then, according to the present proposal, this is true:
a F b ^ b F c ^ a; b 6= b; c
Trope 2 implies:
(a F b ^ a; b 6= b; c)! b 6 F c
Those jointly entail a contradiction. So Trope 2 is incompatible with the existence of
three Fs, even under the revised account of sameness of specified type. Despite rendering
second-order trope theory consistent with the phenomenon we would ordinarily report
using (5), radical conflict with the rest of our world-view remains.
Second strategy: replace the first strategy’s relational predicate ‘ F’ with a plural pred-
icate ‘Fpl’.50 The claim that each of some objects xx is F is then reformulated as the claim
that they Fpl: Fpl(xx). Because pluralities can be of any cardinality, the previous problem
dissipates. But a variant problem remains: incompatibility with the existence of four Fs.
Second-order trope theorists should also be trope theorists aboutplural predication/plural
second-order properties. The most natural extension of Trope 2 to monadic plural pred-
ication says that second-order plural properties can’t be properties of distinct pluralities:
48 This means that exact similarity of tropes won’t suffice as an account of ‘RF’. Alternative options in-
clude: ‘__is similar-in-F-respects to__’ provided ‘F’ is semantically inert; ‘__is an F-trope^ __is an F-trope’.
49 The analogy is not perfect. Whereas ‘RF’ is a predicate of tropes, ‘a
F b’ is a predicate of the objects
that possess them. The third strategy improves the analogy.
50 Thanks to a referee for this suggestion.
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Plural Trope 2: 8xx;Y Y(xx)! 8zz(zz 6= xx! :Y(zz)).
That entails:51
(Fpl(a  b) ^ a  b 6= c  d)! :Fpl(c  d)
Those principles both involve a plural non-identity predicate. So, when do pluralities
count as distinct? Failure to include any of the same objects should suffice. So suppose
a; b; c; d are four distinct Fs. Then plurality a  b counts as distinct from c  d. Since each
of these objects is F, each of a; b is F, and each of c; d is F too. So on the present proposal,
this should be true:52
Fpl(a  b) ^ Fpl(c  d) ^ a  b 6= c  d
Those last two principles cannot both be true. So on the proposed plural reformulation of
sameness of specified type,Plural Trope 2 entails that no four objects are of the same type.
Second-order trope theorists should also be second-order plural trope theorists. So radical
conflict between second-order trope theory and the rest of our world view remains.
Third strategy: replace the single monadic predicate ‘F’ with a range of new monadic
predicates, one for each F object. To capture the fact that satisfiers of these new predicates
are all of the same type, the strategy uses a new expression with two argument positions,
each reserved for ordinary predicates. Ordinary predicates of objects are first-level predi-
cates. Expressions taking first-level predicates in their argument positions are second-level
predicates. In general, i-level predicates are expressions whose argument positions are re-
served for (i 1)-level predicates. I’ll use superscripts to encode level. In this terminology,
the strategy: (a) replaces the original first-level predicate ‘F1’ with many first-level predi-
cates ‘F1a ’, ‘F1b’, ‘F1c ’ etc., one for each object a; b; c etc. that’s (as we would ordinarily say) F;
and (b) uses a new second-level predicate ‘R2F’ to capture the idea that satisfaction of each
of these new predicates corresponds to being of the original type F. The phenomenon we
would ordinarily use (5) to report is then re-described as:
F1a(a) ^ F1b(b) ^ R2F(F1a; F1b) ^ a 6= b
Unlike (5), this is consistent with Trope 2. Of our three strategies, this one is perhaps
closest to the first-order strategy with which this subsection began.
Problems arise from third-order trope theory, which involves generalisation into second-
level predicate position. The third-order analogue of Trope 2 is:
Trope 3: 8X11; : : : ;X1n;Y2
 
Y2(X11; : : : ;X1n)!
8Z11; : : : ;Z1n(X11; : : : ;X1n 6= Z11; : : : ;Z1n ! :Y2(Z11; : : : ;Z1n))

.
(‘Y11; : : : ;Y1n 6= Z11; : : : ;Z1n’ is defined by extending the definition of ‘y1; : : : ; yn 6=
z1; : : : ; zn’ in the obvious way. I discuss higher-order non-identity shortly.)
51 I use ‘’ as a plural term-forming operator. For any singular or plural terms t1; t2, pt1  t2q is a plural
term denoting the plurality comprising exactly the denotations of t1 and t2.
52 Second-order trope theorists could deny this. Only cases of sameness of specified type involving every
object whatsoever of the relevant type could then be captured. So the viewwould be expressively inadequate.
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It is hard to see what could motivate second-order trope theory without also motivating
third-order trope theory. Why take different stances towards repeatability at these differ-
ent orders? Absent an answer to this question, we may safely assume that second-order
trope theorists should also be third-order trope theorists.
This strategy cannot accommodate four Fs. Suppose a; b; c; d are four distinct Fs. Ap-
plying the present strategy, the following should both be true:
F1a(a) ^ F1b(b) ^ R2F(F1a; F2b)
F1c (c) ^ F1d(d) ^ R2F(F1c ; F2d)
So this should be true too:
(7) R2F(F1a; F1b) ^ R2F(F1c ; F1d) ^ F1a; F1b 6= F1c ; F1d
Those theses and Trope 3 employ a higher-order non-identity predicate. So, when do
higher-order aspects of reality count as distinct? Higher-order identity should entail in-
distinguishability. So distinguishability should entail distinctness. Since a; b; c; d are all
distinct, Trope 2 entails that what each ‘F1i ’-predicate expresses is distinguishable from
each other. For example, this is true:
F1a(a) ^ :F1b(a)
So ‘F1a 6= F1b’ is true too. Likewise for each other pair of ‘F1i ’-predicates. So ‘F1a; F1b 6=
F1c ; F1d’ is true. Now,Trope 3 entails: 
R2F(F1a; F1b) ^ F1a; F1b 6= F1c ; F1d
! :R2F(F1c ; F2d)
That and (7) cannot both be true. So on the present approach, the conjunction of Trope
2 andTrope 3 is inconsistent with the existence of fourFs. Since second-order trope theo-
rists should also be third-order trope theorists, radical conflict between second-order trope
theory and the rest of our world view remains. Second-order trope theory should still be
rejected.
This last strategy can iterate up through the hierarchy of levels. Consistency with four
distinct Fs might be preserved by employing a non-standard analysis of sameness of speci-
fied type at the second level: replace the second-level ‘R2F’ with an array of new predicates,
one for each pair of first-level ‘F1i ’-predicates; capture the commonality amongst these new
second-level predicates with a new third-level predicate ‘R3F’. This provides a way to ren-
der second- and third-order trope theory consistent with the existence of four Fs. But a
parallel argument shows that introducing fourth-order trope theory yields inconsistency
with the existence of six Fs. More generally: on the present strategy, the conjunction of
orders of trope theory below any given order is inconsistent with an appropriately large
cardinality of first-order objects that are F. Given the following plausible assumptions, it
follows that all orders of trope theory are false: (a), for some F, there is no upper limit on
how many Fs there could be; (b) each order of trope theory is necessarily true if true. All
(higher) orders of trope theory should therefore be rejected.
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6 Conclusion
Given second-order quantification’s coherence, two ways of formulating a theory of prop-
erties are available, differing over whether their central existence claims are cast in first-
or second-order terms. As we saw in §4 and §5, the second-order theory fundamentally
reshapes two familiar and otherwise intractable metaphysical debates. Once higher-order
quantification is admitted, this is only the first step. Maybe other forms of higher-order
quantification can be used to reshape and resolve other debates. One prominent option
is to use quantification into sentence position to express the existence of propositions,
thereby potentially reshaping, e.g., debates about their constituents and natures. Escape
fromQuinean strictures aboutquantificationpromises to transformthe landscapeofmeta-
physical debate, just as did the escape from Quinean hostility towards non-extensional
contexts in the late twentieth century.
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